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Celebrating the Right to Counsel-And
Extending It
Martha A. Fieldt
I am delighted to participate in this symposium honoring
Vice President Mondale. He has been an enthusiastic supporter of
the Equal Rights Amendment, a nuclear freeze, ending the
Vietnam War, and racial justice, just to name a few of his interests
and accomplishments. Walter Mondale is truly the model of a
politician who has consistently worked for justice. The
contribution I want to focus on today is his fight for recognition of
a constitutional right to counsel for persons accused of felonies,
emanating from the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution
and applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause. The extension to state criminal courts was
accomplished in Gideon v. Wainwright' and has now been
recognized for fifty years.
It is well known that when Walter Mondale was a young
Attorney General in Minnesota and was asked to join a states'
brief opposing Clarence Gideon's petition for a right to defense
counsel in a Florida felony prosecution, Mondale instead organized
a brief in support of Gideon.2 Eventually, more states supported
the pro-Gideon brief than supported the other side.' Mondale's co-
conspirator in this endeavor was Professor Yale Kamisar, whom
t. Langdell Professor, Harvard Law School. The author would like to thank
Stephen R. Shaw, who provided invaluable assistance in preparing this essay.
1. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
2. See Bruce A. Green, Gideon's Amici: Why do Prosecutors So Rarely Defend
the Rights of the Accused?, 122 YALE L.J. 2336, 2340 (2013) (discussing Mondale's
amicus brief on the side of the criminally accused, urging the Supreme Court to
recognize indigent defendants' Sixth Amendment right to appointed counsel in
felony cases); see also Judge Kevin S. Burke, Happy Anniversary, Clarence Gideon,
MINNPOST (Mar. 3, 2013), http://www.minnpost.com/community-
voices/2013/03/happy-anniversary-clarence-gideon (stating that rather than
supporting Florida or simply ignoring the issue, Mondale organized an effort to
gain the support of other states in Gideon's effort to require lawyers for the poor).
3. See History of Right to Counsel, NAT'L LEGAL AiD & DEFENDER AsS'N,
http://www.nlada.org/About/AboutHistoryDefender (last visited Feb. 12, 2014)
("Twenty-two state attorneys general joined petitioner Clarence Earl Gideon in
arguing that Sixth Amendment protection be extended to all defendants charged
with felonies in state courts.").
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we also honor at this conference.
On the basis of one eyewitness identification, Clarence
Gideon had been convicted in Florida's state courts of breaking
and entering with intent to commit a misdemeanor, a felony under
Florida law. He had proclaimed his innocence and asked for an
attorney, but the judge explained that Florida law provided
counsel for indigents only in capital cases.' Defending himself,
Gideon told the jury he was innocent but was ultimately found
guilty and sentenced to five years in prison.6
The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding
there was no right to counsel, so from his prison cell Gideon sent a
penciled petition to the U.S. Supreme Court claiming he had been
denied his constitutional rights. The Court granted the petition,
appointed then-attorney Abe Fortas to represent Gideon before the
Supreme Court, and eventually held unanimously that the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel applies to the states, overturning
Betts v. Brady8 and its contrary holding.' Justice Black wrote the
decision, emphasizing that there could not be a fair trial without
counsel for the accused. "
This victory in Gideon was of extraordinary importance to
constitutional criminal procedure. It is the only "new"
constitutional rule that the Supreme Court has held fully
retroactive, because its deprivation so risks convicting the
innocent." Accordingly, the Court applied the rule even to
convictions that were fully final when Gideon was announced, thus
emptying state prisons of all who had been convicted without the
4. See Gideon, 372 U.S. at 336 ("Petitioner was charged in a Florida state
court with having broken and entered a poolroom with intent to commit a
misdemeanor.").
5. Id. at 337.
6. Id.
7. Id. at n.1.
8. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
9. See Gideon v. Wainwright,372 U.S.335,345 (1963).
10. Id. at 345-46("The right of one charged with crime to counsel may not be
deemed fundamental and essential to fair trials in some countries, but it is in
ours .... This noble ideal cannot be realized if the poor man charged with crime
has to face his accusers without a lawyer to assist him.").
11. See John H. Blume, Gideon Exceptionalism, 122 YALE L.J. 2126, 2131 (2013)
("Gideon is the only decision ever cited by the Supreme Court as an example of the
kind of watershed rule of criminal procedure that so implicates fundamental
fairness as to require retroactive application in habeas corpus."); accord Justin F.
Marceau, Gideon's Shadow, 122 YALE L.J. 2482, 2490-91 (2013)(stating Gideon's
legacy justifies onerous limitations on constitutional remediation and justifies the
retroactivity doctrine).
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assistance of counsel, whether they had requested counsel or not.12
The states' options were to release or retry following constitutional
requirements, and Gideon himself was retried with appointed
counsel and was cleared of the burglary.'3  No other new rule of
criminal procedure has been similarly applied.
The current Court continues to regard the right to counsel as
extraordinary. For example, it repeatedly describes the right to
counsel as the one "bedrock" or "watershed" rule of criminal
procedure without which an unacceptable risk of an erroneous
conviction exists.14 Because the right to counsel is so intimately
tied up with fundamental fairness and with accuracy of results, it
is critical to extend it, or some version of it, beyond the felony
context and to recognize a right to counsel in other particularly
sensitive contexts as well.
We depend upon, and need, an adversary process in this
country. Without such a process, courts will not be presented with
both sides of legal arguments or both sides of factual controversies
to aid their decisions. For an adversary process to work, both
sides must be represented by competent counsel. Such a process is
much more likely to lead to just and accurate outcomes than one in
which all the legal talent is on one side.
I will discuss four very different examples of situations that
call for a greater leveling of the playing field by providing counsel
for persons in a disadvantaged position who cannot afford counsel
on their own. The final example shows, as well, that provision of
counsel, while essential and helpful, may not be sufficient to bring
about needed reforms. At least that is true in institutions like the
military, where a fair and independent adversary process seems
unachievable as long as command control of court martial
proceedings remains the norm.
12. See Blume, supra note 11, at 2130-31 (describing how Gideon transformed
criminal justice for thousands of indigent defendants incarcerated when it was
decided: "thousands of unrepresented prisoners were released, many of whom could
not be retried.").
13. Bruce A. Courtade, Gideon at 50, 92 MICH. B.J. 14, 14 (2013) (describing
that on retrial, Panama City criminal defense attorney W. Fred Turner was
appointed to represent Gideon, and at the conclusion of the trial, the jury found
Gideon not guilty, and he was immediately released from custody).
14. See, e.g., Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 419 (2007) (identifying Gideon




I. Giving Up Newborns and Other Children for Adoption
Lawyers need to be brought into the adoption process-
lawyers for the parent(s) surrendering the child, that is. When the
State is removing a child, it is well-armed with lawyers, social
service workers, and expert witnesses, but those forced to
surrender their parental rights are not always represented by an
advocate for their interests. The situation is similar with respect
to "voluntary" adoption proceedings between birthparents and an
agency, for example, or more directly between birthparents and a
couple who wants to adopt." Frequently the surrendering parents
either are represented by an attorney of the adopters' choosing or
are not represented at all.16
The Supreme Court has paid some heed to the problem when
it comes to a state's termination of parental rights. In Lassiter v.
Department of Social Services,7 the Court implied that the
government must sometimes provide counsel for indigent parents
at termination hearings.'1 Nonetheless, the holding was not a
victory for parents' rights: the Court held that the government
need not automatically provide counsel to parents when the State
seeks to terminate their parental rights, and also that it was not
required to provide it in the particular case before the Court.'
The Court acknowledged the connection between provision of an
attorney and the accuracy of results," but nonetheless held that
provision of an attorney was constitutionally required on this
ground only when it appears to the court that provision of counsel
would make a determinative difference.
15. See, e.g., Pamela K Strom Amlung, Conflicts of Interest in Independent
Adoptions: Pitfalls for the Unwary, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 169, 169 (1990) (stating that
a "birth mother is typically not represented by counsel").
16. Id. at 169-70 (arguing that, in addition to the lack of representation for
surrendering parents, "the attorney representing the adoptive parents is often
confronted with the responsibility for advising the birth mother of the consequences
of signing the consent form . . .. [Tihere is inevitably a potential for a conflict of
interest to arise").
17. 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
18. Id. at 30 ("Thus, courts have generally held that the state must appoint
counsel for indigent parents at termination proceedings.").
19. Id. at 31 ("[N]either can we say that the Constitution requires the
appointment of counsel in every parental terminating proceeding.").
20. Id. at 28 ("[Alccurate and just results are most likely to be obtained through
the equal contest of opposed interests ... represented by counsel, without whom
the contest of interests may become unwholesomely unequal.").
21. Id. at 33 ("True, a lawyer might have done more ... but ... the absence of
counsel] ... did not render the proceedings fundamentally unfair.").
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The case was decided by a 5-4 vote.2 2 One of the dissents
pointed out that unrepresented defendants might be unable to
make a convincing case that an attorney is needed; an attorney
may be necessary to show that an attorney is necessary.2 Another
dissent argued that, regardless of expense, counsel should be
provided because a priceless deprivation like losing one's children
should not be made without due process of law.2 4
The Lassiter rule is reminiscent of the approach that existed
before Gideon. In Betts, the case Gideon overturned, the Court
had ruled that no lawyer was necessary for criminal defendants in
state court unless the case was unusually complex or unless the
defendant was illiterate or otherwise incompetent.2 5 Just as that
approach was inadequate for criminal defendants, it is also
inadequate for persons facing state proceedings to declare them
unfit parents and to terminate their relationship with their
children. Following the same concern for correct results and for
the rights of disadvantaged parties evidenced in Gideon, Lassiter
should be overturned in favor of a right to counsel for indigent
parents whose custody of their children is threatened.
As I have written elsewhere, provision of counsel for
indigent parents is even more necessary at the stage when
children are removed from the home than it is at final termination
of parental rights. Counsel should be provided at the removal
stage as well as at the later proceeding, when the State seeks to
terminate parental rights.27 Once the child is removed from the
home, the likelihood of parents being able to regain custody
decreases exponentially. 28 But here, I am advocating more than a
consistent policy of providing counsel at parental termination
proceedings and extending that right to the prior proceedings to
remove the child(ren) from the home. Even when the State is not
the moving party and the parents are giving up their child for
adoption, through an agency or otherwise, the surrendering
parents need to be represented by counsel.
22. Id. at 18.
23. Id. at 50-51 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
24. Id. at 59 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
25. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 472-73 (1942).
26. Martha A. Field & Valerie A. Sanchez, Equal Treatment for People with
Mental Retardation 317-21 (2000).
27. Id. at 317-20.
28. Id. at 318-19 (arguing that "removal can easily become permanent, and




The argument that counsel be provided relies on the view
that giving up a child for adoption is one of the most profound and
significant decisions a person can make. Moreover, the
surrendering parent is likely to be in very difficult circumstances,
especially relative to well-heeled adopting parents. One kind of
pressure that may exist behind even a "voluntary" adoption is a
threat of state removal of the child and a termination of parental
rights.29 If all indications are that the parents will lose their child
anyway, a voluntary adoption may be the path of least resistance.
But even when there is not pressure from social services
agencies, a typical surrendering parent is pressured by
circumstance. A common scenario involves a young unmarried
woman unable to care for her newborn. The father may have
abandoned mother and child or he may simply be unwilling to
raise the child, but in either case the mother may be in dire
circumstances. Moreover, the adoption decision is made, in many
states irrevocably, in the few days after the birth.o A person who
has just given birth may be in an especially vulnerable position at
that time and may even be acting irrationally.3' It is not
appropriate to require a person in such a state to irrevocably sign
away her rights on such a fundamental subject as raising her
child. A decision made in this manner without an advocate and
without knowledgeable advice being provided on the decision
should not be accepted as voluntary. And it is important that its
involuntariness be recognized from the outset, with a per se rule,
so that a child will not begin life with pre-adoptive parents only to
be returned to birth parents later in life. 32
29. See, e.g., Kathleen A. Bailie, The Other "Neglected" Parties in Child
Protective Proceedings: Parents in Poverty and the Role of the Lawyers Who
Represent Them, FORDHAM L. REV. 2285, 2297 (1998) ("The strain of having one's
children taken away is extremely distressing for parents in poverty, who are often
undereducated and unworldly. This stressful situation weakens parents and,
therefore, further exacerbates the imbalance of power that already favors the state
in child protection proceedings. The state is clearly in control in neglect
proceedings, for not only does it present the case to the court, but its 'adversary,'
the parent, is unfamiliar with the intricacies of the legal proceedings. As such,
parents are often unable to effectively assert their rights.").
30. See MARTHA A. FIELD, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD 90-93(1991).
31. Id. at 90 (discussing how some states attempt to rectify the vulnerable and
uncomfortable position of mothers who have just given birth by imposing "a waiting
period after the child's birth during which the mother could not surrender the child
for adoption").
32. Id. at 89("[I]t is best that a baby's custody not be changed back and forth,
whether she is to live with her natural parent(s) or with an adoptive family. It is in
the best interests of the child to have a clear rule from the outset as to who her
[Vol. 32:287292
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Parents who give up older children, of course, also may labor
under difficult circumstances. They often act under threat of a
removal of the children by the State. Children whose parents have
disabilities, for example, may not come to the attention of the
social services system until the children are enrolled in school.33
At that point, the authorities sometimes start to question the
parenting of persons with disabilities, especially intellectual
disabilities. Parents prevailed upon to give up their children
should surely be represented by counsel-counsel that is on their
side. Alternatively, a few parents put older children up for
adoption because they simply cannot cope, or because they must
serve a long jail sentence or undergo medical treatment, or for
some other reason.
In short, adoption is unlikely to be a joyful occasion for the
surrendering parent(s), although typically it is a joyous occasion
for the adopting parents. Surely any surrendering parents who
are in a celebratory mood would count as a small minority. In
Gonzales v. Carhart," Justice Kennedy patronizingly opined about
abortion in denying the plaintiffs the procedure of their choice:
"some women come to regret their choice to abort the infant life
they once created and sustained. Severe depression and loss of
esteem can follow."" Surely this statement is more generally true
about giving up a child for adoption. Many surrendering parents
come to regret their decision, or at least to regret that they had to
make it.
In our class-based adoption system, in which the
comparatively well-to-do adopt the children of the poor, it is
essential to protect against possible exploitation by making certain
that persons who are losing their children know their rights and
can assert them. A birthmother should be advised, for example,
proper custodian is, to prevent her from beina transferred back and forth between
parties who are feuding over their parental rights.").
33. See, e.g., Alexis C. Collentine, Respecting Intellectually Disabled Parents: A
Call for Change in State Termination of Parental Rights Statutes, 34 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 535, 543 (2005) (noting that "a common cause of action against delayed
parents is educational neglect, or failing to ensure that the child is attending
school").
34. Id. ("Mentally delayed parents more often face allegations of neglect. . .
see also Dale Margolin, No Chance to Prove Themselves: The Rights of Mentally
Disabled Parents under the Americans with Disabilities Act and State Law, 15 VA.
J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 112, 160-61 (2007) ("[It becomes easy to make an automatic
leap from disability to inability to care for a child, in both casework practice and as
proof in court.").
35. 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
36. Id. at 159 (internal citations omitted).
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that it is only when she relinquishes custody of her child that she
may lose all rights and all ability to play a role in her child's life. 37
She also should know that a promise to give up a child for
adoption, made before birth, has no binding effect.3 8 A right to
counsel could greatly help.
To provide counsel, free of charge, to persons who cannot
afford lawyers but are giving up their children, would likely have a
large and ultimately salutary effect upon the forms adoption takes
in this country. First and foremost, it could help prevent the
surrendering parents from being coerced. But even when giving
up the child is necessary, a lawyer could also help surrendering
parents understand their legal position and their rights.
Surrendering parents, especially those who are not being
coerced by the State, are likely to be in a strong bargaining
position. Healthy newborns are particularly in demand. The
surrendering parents cannot bargain for money without violating
the baby selling laws, 3 but they are in a position to insist on an
adoption arrangement that leaves them some part to play in the
child's life. Even if surrendering parents are not seeking such a
plan at the moment of adoption, the prudent lawyer would leave it
open to them to demand some contact in the future. Such an
arrangement would prove much more palatable to many
surrendering parents than the traditional total surrender of
parental rights and contact with the child.
Nor need the possibility of contact with the surrendering
parents be disruptive to children. Full parental rights would
reside with the adoptive parents, and their legal status would not
be affected by the child's relationship with the parents who gave
the child up. Adoption would remain fully final. Depending upon
the circumstances, contact could be limited to twice a year, for
example, and involve supervised visitation if necessary.
Sometimes contact might be by mail only, at least until a certain
age. Sometimes more contact, or contact with the whole adoptive
37. FIELD, supra note 29, at 89 ("Once she turned over the baby, however, she
would have performed her part of the bargain and the contract would be complete
and binding.").
38. Id. at 84 ("In an adoption situation, no state in this country binds a mother
to give up her child because of a consent to adoption or a contract with prospective
adoptive parents that was executed before the child was born.").
39. See In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1234-35 (N.J. 1988) ("[We find the
payment of money to a 'surrogate' mother illegal .... We find no offense to our
present laws where a woman voluntarily and without payment agrees to act as a
'surrogate' mother, provided that she is not subject to a binding agreement to
surrender her child.").
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family, might be desirable. An adoption contract could stipulate
what model of open adoption was contemplated or could leave its
contours open.
Having a lawyer for the surrendering couple would
undoubtedly accelerate the use of an open adoption model. It
would permit birthparents, who often are without fault in having
to give up their children, to have some limited role in the life of
their child as she is growing up. Such an outcome could better
serve the interests of both surrendering parents and surrendered
children than the traditional total-surrender model, without
significantly reducing adoptive parents' authority. Some
possibility for future contact is likely to result when the
surrendering parents have their own legal advice and recognize
their ability to affect the terms of an adoption arrangement.
II. Post-Conviction Habeas Corpus
One context in which it is simply foolish not to recognize a
right to counsel is federal post-conviction relief, that is, federal
habeas corpus for state prisoners under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-54 and
the similar § 2255 motions for federal prisoners. I will focus on
habeas corpus, but since habeas corpus and §2255 actions have
very similar rules, most points apply to federal prisoners' § 2255
petitions as well.
Since at least 1963, habeas corpus was available without any
limitation, providing at least a theoretical possibility of release as
long as one was in prison, if the prisoner could show that his
incarceration violated the U.S. Constitution. 40 Habeas resulted in
much litigation, often orchestrated by jailhouse lawyers, but not
many releases." The Supreme Court's reaction against this
expansive habeas started in 1976 in Stone v. Powell,42 which
essentially removed habeas for search and seizure violations. The
cutback accelerated significantly in Wainwright v. Sykes43 and
40. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 402 (1963) ("If the imprisonment cannot be
shown to conform with the fundamental requirements of law, the individual is
entitled to his immediate release.").
41. See PETER W. LOW ET AL., FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW OF FEDERAL-
STATE RELATIONS 824 (7th ed. 2011) (characterizing current habeas litigation as
"both extremely complicated and highly unlikely to grant relief in any particular
case").
42. 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (holding habeas unavailable to address Fourth
Amendment claims unless there had been no opportunity to present the claim in
the trial court).
43. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
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ensuing cases, which held that on habeas a petitioner must show
"cause and prejudice" for not having raised a contention earlier,
and which defined the terms "cause and prejudice" very
narrowly." The narrowing decisions piled up quickly, but none
seemed more devastating to the traditional, indeed hallowed, right
of habeas corpus than Congress's Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)," which purported to set out
the new rules.
AEDPA adopted many of the cutbacks to habeas that the
Rehnquist Court had created and often made them even stricter.
But the key provision was a statute of limitations for habeas
corpus and § 2255 actions, requiring that the action be brought
within one year of conviction (with tolling for time spent in state
post-conviction relief)."
All of these prerequisites to having one's constitutional
claims adjudicated on the merits have created a system that can
be extremely difficult for a petitioner to navigate. One's claim
cannot be heard unless one has an airtight explanation for not
having raised it earlier." Even then, it must not be "harmless
error," in the sense that there is much untainted evidence
attesting to the petitioner's guilt." The only way around those
requirements is for the petitioner somehow to show that he is
44. See, e.g., Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 494 (1986) (noting that
"both cause and prejudice must be shown, at least in a habeas corpus proceeding
challenging a state court conviction.").
45. Pub. L. No. 104-132, §§ 101-108, 110 Stat. 1214, 1217-26 (1996) (codified as
amended in part at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244-55 (2006)).
46. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2) (expanding upon the Wainwright holding by
barring "a claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus
application ... that was not presented in a prior application" unless the claim
"relies on a new rule of constitutional law" that has been made retroactive by the
Supreme Court, or that "(i) the factual predicate for the claim could not have been
discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence; and (ii) the facts
underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole,
would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for
constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty
of the underlying offense").
47. Id. at § 2244(d), § 2255(f).
48. See, e.g., Murray, 477 U.S. at 492 ("[Clause for a procedural default on
appeal ordinarily requires a showing of some external impediment preventing
counsel from constructing or raising the claim.").
49. Even though this is not the only, or the preferable, way to define harmless
error, the Court in habeas cases has looked to the amount of untainted evidence
against the petitioner in order to say that there was no prejudice. See Martha A.
Field, Assessing the Harmlessness of Federal Constitutional Error-A Process in
Need of a Rationale, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 15, 17-18 (1976).
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"probably . . . innocent." 0 If the petitioner has raised an issue
before and had it adjudicated, the habeas court will presume prior
factual findings to be correct and will review only to see if the
decision "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application
of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States."" And even a claim that was raised
cannot be heard if it suggests "a new rule;" that is, one that was
not dictated by existing precedent at the time of the conviction.52
A conviction will not necessarily be overturned even if it is found
to be wrong; the judge must have acted unreasonably as well as
erroneously.53
A state prisoner petitioning for habeas corpus must first
exhaust all available state remedies, including post-conviction
remedies.' Every claim he presents to the federal habeas court
must have been exhausted." If in error, the petitioner presents an
unexhausted claim, he will either forfeit that claim proceeding
only with the exhausted ones, or he will need to return to state
court to have it heard.56 But by the time the federal judge rules
that she cannot hear a claim because it is not exhausted, the one-
year period for federal filing may have expired.57 The prisoner's
only hope at that point is to persuade the judge in her discretion to
grant a stay and abeyance, keeping the federal claim alive while
the prisoner repairs to state court.
Another problem is that the petitioner is usually not
50. See Murray, 477 U.S. at 496.
51. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
52. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 316 (1989); see also Butler v. McKellar, 494
U.S. 407, 412-414 (1990) (citing recent precedent to explain that the Court will not
apply new rules to cases that were decided before the rule was announced).
53. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 365 (2000); see also Bell v. Cone, 535
U.S. 685, 699 (2002) ("It is not enough to convince a federal habeas corpus court
that [the judge applied the law] incorrectly. Rather, he must show that Ithe judge
applied the law] to the facts of his case in an objectively unreasonable manner.").
54. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1).
55. Id. at § 2254(c).
56. See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 520 (1982).
57. See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 186 (2001) ("The statute tolls the one-
year limitations period during the time the prisoner proceeds in the state courts.
But unless the statute also tolls the limitations period during the time the defective
petition was pending in federal court, the state prisoner may find, when he seeks to
return to federal court, that he has run out of time.").
58. See Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277 (2005) ("Because granting a stay
effectively excuses a petitioner's failure to present his claims first to the state
courts, stay and abeyance is only appropriate when the district court determines




permitted to come to federal court more than once, so there is a
danger in the petitioner not presenting all of his claims at the
same time. Second or successive motions for habeas must be
certified by a panel of the court of appeals to contain either newly-
discovered evidence that would be sufficient to establish that no
reasonable factfinder would have found the petitioner guilty, or a
new and previously unavailable rule of constitutional law that the
Supreme Court has already made retroactive."9 Even if the
motions get by the court of appeals panel, the district judge must
dismiss the claims if they do not meet those requirements." In
short, the opportunities for a second habeas petition are almost
nonexistent.
These are only a few of the tangle of rules that impede access
to federal habeas corpus. Suffice it to say that the system has
changed radically since the 1960s and 1970s and that much
sophistication is required to have one's petition heard on the
merits today. Prisoners are not equipped to handle the procedural
complexities on their own; when they try, they manage to forfeit
even the best of claims. If there is to be post-conviction relief at all
(and many believe that is constitutionally required even for state
prisoners), petitioners need counsel to assist them.
Strangely, the habeas statute does have a provision
protecting against accidental forfeiture of rights, but it is the
State, and not the prisoner, who is protected. Section 2254(b)(3)
provides, "[a] State shall not be deemed to have waived the
exhaustion requirement or be estopped from reliance upon the
requirement unless the State, through counsel, expressly waives
the requirement."" It is understandable that prosecuting
attorneys would be tripped up by the complications of the new
habeas requirements. But it is deeply cynical to subject indigent
and often uneducated prisoners to these same requirements as a
precondition to presenting their constitutional claims for release.
III. Immigration
The United States is a nation of immigrants, but not all
immigrants are welcomed with open arms. Instead, a robust
system of immigration law enforcement has developed to
apprehend, detain, and ultimately deport illegal immigrants or
59. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A), § 2255(h) (2006).
60. Id.§ 2244(b)(4).
61. Id. at § 2254(b)(3).
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noncitizens breaking the law. While this development is not new,
the process is much more frequently employed than it used to be.
The American Bar Association notes that "[ijn recent years, the
grounds for removal have expanded, the available relief from
removal has been restricted, and the use of detention . .. has
skyrocketed."62
Detention and deportation of immigrants, like criminal
punishment, is an extreme sanction, and also, like criminal
punishment, is based upon allegations of wrongdoing.
Nonetheless, because immigration proceedings are considered
administrative and not criminal, the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel does not necessarily apply to them.6 3 This is unfortunate,
not only because these proceedings carry a "particularly severe
penalty,"" but also because sympathetic presentation of the
equities of the particular case and accuracy of factfinding are
essential to just results. The current system is inequitable on its
face and unjustified by pragmatic reasons.
The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) provides for a
right to hire counsel,6  a right that exists in all of the problem
categories discussed in this essay. In our unequal economy,
however, many people are unable to take advantage of such a
right. Immigration provides an apt example. Currently, more
than half of the individuals who face immigration proceedings are
without representation, and this proportion rises to eighty-four
62. AM. BAR. ASS'N, RIGHT TO COUNSEL RESOLUTION 3 (2006), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/damlaba/migrated/intlaw/policy/humanrights/i
mmigration2 06107A.authcheckdam.pdf. Although, on preliminary reports, 2013
deportation numbers are down eleven percent from 2012, this likely results from
high-profile political concerns rather than a clear move away from immigration
enforcement. Stephen Dinan, Report: Deportations Plummet in 2013, Lowest Since
2007, WASH. TIMES (Oct. 30, 2013),
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/oct/30/deportations-plummet-2013-
lowest-2007/?page=all (reporting that 364,700 illegal immigrants were deported in
2013 compared to nearly 410,000 in 2012).
63. Note, Representation by Counsel in Administrative Proceedings, 58 COLUM.
L. REV. 395, 406 (1958) ("The [S]ixth [A]mendment does not require the
appointment of counsel in civil actions, nor has such a requirement been inferred
from the due process clauses. Arguably, an administrative proceeding in which one
of the parties is an organ or agency of government is not of a pure civil nature. It is
not, however, penal.").
64. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 365 (2010) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
65. 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (2006) (providing that an individual is entitled to "the
privilege of being represented (at no expense to the Government) by such
counsel ... as he shall choose").
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percent of those in detention." While detained, noncitizens are
unable to earn money with which to hire an attorney, and,
regardless, would face further logistical hurdles in doing so.67 It is
practically impossible for most individuals caught up in the
immigration system to retain counsel at their own expense.
The lack of representation has profound consequences.
Immigration law is a maze of complexity, difficult to navigate even
for a lawyer and even for persons who speak English; for non-
English speakers, the likelihood of understanding one's rights and
potential legal options is even lower. When one considers that
many individuals facing deportation are likely to have little
education or money, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that they
will be unable to represent themselves effectively.
It is not surprising that a 2004 Department of Justice report
found that pro se immigrants succeeded in their appeals only ten
percent of the time; when represented pro bono, success rates rose
to forty percent.6 Predictably, representation in immigration
proceedings measurably improves one's chances of avoiding
deportation and staying with one's family.
Many academics have argued that, administrative or not,
immigration proceedings implicate constitutional due process
rights. 69 Although the INA requires that counsel in immigration
proceedings appear at no expense to the government, a broader
constitutional ruling overturning this INA provision is not
unimaginable." Indeed, Padilla v. Kentucky recently found that
66. COMM'N OF IMMIGRATION, AM. BAR ASS'N, REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION
SYSTEM 5-8 (2010) [hereinafter REFORMING], available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/Immigration/PublicDocume
nts/aba complete full report.authcheckdam.pdf. The report also notes that
generally, "[riepresented noncitizens tend to fare better than those who navigate
the process without assistance." Id. at 5-9.
67. See Michael Kaufman, Detention, Due Process, and the Right to Counsel in
Removal Proceedings, 4 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 113, 116 (2008) (noting "the remote
location of detention facilities, transfers, restrictive detention policies, and the
inability to earn money").
68. EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE BIA PRO
BONO PROJECT IS SUCCESSFUL, Attachment E (2004), available at
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/reports/BIAProBonoProjectEvaluation.pdf.
69. See, e.g., Kaufman, supra note 67; Matt Adams, Advancing the "Right" to
Counsel in Removal Proceedings, 9 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 169, 169 (2010).
70. See Adams, supra note 69, at 176 ("[Tlhere remains a notable absence of
case law exploring the right to assigned counsel based on the Constitution. The
right to assigned counsel in other criminal and civil proceedings was almost
uniformly the result of constitutional challenges, not the result of Congress's
largesse."). Congress may occasionally be more generous than Adams credits it; the
Senate's immigration reform bill would provide free lawyers to "particularly
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the severity of deportation justified invoking the Sixth
Amendment's right to effective counsel when an attorney fails to
advise a client of the immigration consequences of a guilty plea.7
Currently, a great many persons are being deported: 368,644
noncitizens were deported in 2013.72 By comparison, the U.S.
Navy counts just under 324,000 active duty personnel." There is a
thirty percent difference in successful immigration appeals
between represented and unrepresented noncitizens;" thirty
percent of the number of people deported in 2013 is about 110,000,
while the IRS had 97,742 employees in 2012." Immigration law
touches, and irrevocably upends, a remarkable number of lives
each year. Noncitizens need representation in order to receive a
fair hearing, and justice requires that they be provided counsel at
immigration proceedings.
IV. Sexual Assault and Rape in the Military
Like the adoption topic discussed above, this topic applies
particularly to women, but it by no means applies only to women.
It is estimated that 53% of unwanted sexual contact in the
military involve male victims. 76  Although this is a numerical
majority, rape in the military falls much more severely upon
vulnerable" immigrants in deportation proceedings. See Mark Noferi, Deportation
Without Representation, SLATE (May 15, 2013, 12:04 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news-and-politics/jurisprudence/2013/05/the-immigr
ation bill shouldinclude the right.to-a_1awyer.html.
71. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 374 (2010) ("We now hold that counsel
must inform her client whether his plea carries a risk of deportation. Our
longstanding Sixth Amendment precedents, the seriousness of deportation as a
consequence of a criminal plea, and the concomitant impact of deportation on
families living lawfully in this country demand no less."). Padilla's holding
overcame the Supreme Court of Kentucky's distinction between direct and
collateral consequences of a guilty plea for Sixth Amendment purposes for the first
time. This solicitude for deportation as an exceptionally significant life event may
well signal a willingness to extend other constitutional rights.
72.U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, ERO ANNUAL REPORT: FY
2013 ICE IMMIGRATION REMOVALS 1(2013).
73. Status of the Navy, U.S. NAVY,
http://www.navy.millnavydata/navlegacy.asp?id=146(last visited Apr. 2, 2014).
74. EXEc. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, supra note 68.
75. Employment and Trends-September 2012, U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
MANAGEMENT,http://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/data-analysis-
documentation/federal-employment-reports/employment-trends-
data/2012/september/table-15/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2014).
76. James Dao, In Debate Over Military Sexual Assault, Men Are Overlooked




women when their relatively low numbers are taken into account.
One study found that 79% of enlisted women reported sexual
harassment during military service, 54% reported unwanted
sexual contact, and 30% had experienced at least one attempted or
completed rape."
After years of controversy, Congress has finally taken action.
The recently passed National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2014" (NDAA) includes numerous reforms of the military's
handling of sexual assault claims, including the extension of a
right to counsel, provided free of charge, to any person filing a
sexual assault complaint." This uncharacteristic reform coming
from today's do-nothing Congress can be explained in large part
because it seems impolitic to oppose this "women's issue,"
especially given the current epidemic of increasing sexual assault
and rape in the ranks."
Two women on the Senate Armed Services Committee are the
force behind the changes. They are Senator Claire McCaskill of
Missouri and Senator Kirsten Gillibrand of New York, both
Democrats." The NDAA reforms-including the elimination of
sexual assault statutes of limitations, restrictions on commanders'
power to overturn jury verdicts and amend sentences, and various
provisions enhancing victims' welfare throughout the court-
martial process-were supported by the Senators but fall short of
both Senators' proposed bills. Senator Gillibrand supports reforms
suggested by Senator McCaskill but wants to go further in
77. See Anne G. Sadler et al., Factors Associated with Women's Risk of Rape in
the Military Environment, 43 AM. J. INDUS. MED. 262, 266 (2003). Repeated rape is
also a problem: thirty-seven percent of women who had encountered rape had
experienced it more than once, while fourteen percent reported being gang-raped.
Id.
78. H.R. 3304, 113th Cong. (2013) (enacted).
79. Id. § 1716.
80. The Department of Defense reported in the summer of 2013 that an
estimated 26,000 service members were sexually assaulted in 2012, up from 19,000
in 2010. 1 U.S. DEP'T OF DEF. SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION & RESPONSE,
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ANNUAL REPORT ON SEXUAL ASSAULT IN THE MILITARY:
FISCAL YEAR 2012 at 12 (2013) [hereinafter SAPR REPORT], available at
http://www.sapr.mil/public/docs/reports/FY12_DoDSAPROAnnualReport onSe
xualAssault-VOLUMEONE.pdf.
81. A number of bills have also been proposed by members of the House of
Representatives, particularly Representative Jackie Speier, but the competing bills
in the Senate have driven the issue into the public eye. See Darren Samuelsohn &
Anna Palmer, Kirsten Gillibrand and Military Sexual Assault: 5 Things to Watch,
POLITICO (June 13, 2013, 2:46 PM), http//www.politico.com/story/2013/06/kirsten-
gillibrand-military-sexual-assault-92749.html.
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reducing the influence of military commanders. 2
The culture of the military, and whether to support or bypass
it, is at the heart of the controversy between the two Senators.
The military now admits women in large numbers and allows
them to be given the same responsibilities as other soldiers, but
these are fairly recent developments. Women now compose nearly
fifteen percent of the military but are extremely underrepresented
in the top ranks."
With gender integration have come more frequent problems
of harassment, sexual assault, and even rape. One in three
women in the military is sexually assaulted (as compared to one in
six in the civilian world).' The "vast majority" involve service
member on service member, with female junior enlistees the
typical victims, and older, higher-ranking males the typical
perpetrators. Approximately one in thirteen reported assaults
get to court-martial." Most who are convicted get a fine, and some
are let off lightly with a lesser included offense.8 7 Repeat offenders
are thought to commit ninety percent of the assaults."
On this issue, the prevalent policy in the command unit is
"don't ask, don't tell." Like a family, the unit should not air its
problems in the outside world; any problems should be taken care
of within. Complaining victims cause trouble. Soldiers who report
rape or sexual assault may thereby end their careers. It is not
unusual for complaining soldiers to be dismissed from the military
for a "personality disorder.""
82. Stacy Kaper, Gillibrand, McCaskill Duel for Votes on Sex Assault Bill,
NATIONAL JOURNAL (Nov. 19, 2013),
http://www.nationaljournal.com/daily/gillibrand-mccaskill-duel-for-votes-on-sex-
assault-bill-20131119.
83. By the Numbers: Women in the U.S. Military, CNN (Jan. 24, 2013, 5:27
PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/01/24/us/military-women-glance. Women make up
approximately seven percent of the top ranks, or "69 of 976 generals and
admirals."Id.
84. Molly O'Toole, Military Sexual Assault Epidemic Continues to Claim







89. David S. Martin, Rape Victims Say Military Labels them 'Crazy,' CNN (Apr.
14, 2012, 12:29 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/04/14/health/military-sexual-
assaults-personality-disorder/ ("CNN has interviewed women in all branches of the
armed forces, including the Coast Guard, who tell stories that follow a similar
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The NDAA does prohibit explicit retaliation against reporting
victims, but the existing procedural system still does not accord
with basic notions of an adversary process and is not calculated to
produce just results. To review only a few of its inequities for
persons who complain of sexual assault or rape: the commanding
officer of the accused has the ultimate decision whether to bring
charges;"o he can delay the decision for many months if he
wishes;91 part of the assessment can involve the value of the officer
to the military-it will cut in his favor if he is an excellent football
player or a popular or efficient officer, for example, even though
those factors have nothing to do with the charges;92 if the
commander does proceed, he selects the pool from which the court-
martial panels, the functional analogues to juries, are selected.
Panels often contain no women.93  No wonder almost ninety
percent of sexual assaults in the military go unreported." They
are unlikely to result in punishment to the accused.
Senator Claire McCaskill has proposed several small changes
to the current policy beyond those now embodied in the NDAA. 95
She would place the authority in senior officers, not unit
commanders, as is currently done, and would prohibit the
pattern-a sexual assault, a command dismissive of the allegations and a
psychiatric discharge.").
90. O'Toole, supra note 84 ("Under the [Uniform Code of Military Justice], the
accused's commander is responsible for reviewing the initial report and
determining whether there is sufficient evidence to take action.").
91. FAQ 19, Sexual Harassment/Assault Response and Prevention, U.S. ARMY,
http://www.sexualassault.army.mil/faqs.cfm (last visited Feb. 13, 2014) ("The
delayed action policy means that a Commander may delay action, but does not
require delaying action.").
92. See O'Toole, supra note 84 ("[Clommanding officers are authorized to take
into account factors unrelated to the case, such as the value of the accused to the
unit."). Although the NDAA addresses this issue, it only mandates that the
Secretary of Defense produce a proposed amendment to eliminate these factors
from consideration in sexual assault cases within 180 days. H.R. 3304, 113th Cong.
§ 1708 (2013) (enacted). Legislating the initiation of a review process is quite
different from legislating reform.
93. See United States v. Smith, 27 M.J. 242, 249 (C.M.A. 1988) ("Congress has
not required that court-martial panels be unrepresentative of the military
population."). Given the relatively small number of women in the military, and
especially in higher ranks, see supra note 83 and accompanying text, this lack of
representation is unsurprising.
94. SAPR REPORT, supra note 80, at 97.
95. Although the NDAA includes many reforms, both Senators McCaskill and
Gillibrand continue to further their more comprehensive proposals. See Meredith
Clark, What's Next in the Fight to Stop Military Sexual Assault, MSNBC (Dec. 13,
2013, 3:00 PM), http://www.msnbc.com/melissa-harris-perry/stopping-military-
sexual-assault-round-2.
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consideration of a defendant's value as a soldier in acquittal. 96 But
most of the changes proposed by Senator McCaskill have been
supported by the military and the Department of Defense and
adopted in the NDAA. They do indeed ameliorate the current
situation.
One reason for the military to have supported the reforms,
apart from the embarrassment of increasing tales of sexual
assault, is that a more radical set of reforms that the military
would like to resist has been put forward by Senator Gillibrand.9"
Senator Gillibrand would remove responsibility for prosecution
from the chain of command and place authority in independent
military prosecutors." These would be lawyers and presumably
would be more objective, and more governed by law, than military
commanders. She would require that all charges of sexual crimes
be referred to these prosecutors, who would face a ninety-day
deadline for initiating proceedings. 99  The issue between the
proposals is whether the Gillibrand approach will undermine the
command structure in a harmful way.'co Senator McCaskill and
the military claim that Senator Gillibrand's proposed reforms
would undermine military cohesion.'' They say a sentence is
more meaningful if imposed within the chain of command, and
96. See Laura Bassett, Key Military Sexual Assault Reforms Dropped from
Defense Bill, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 10, 2013, 12:10 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/12/10/military-sexual-
assault_n_4419029.html. Some progress has been made in involving more senior
commanders in the adjudication of sexual assault cases. See Memorandum from
Leon Panetta, Sec'y of Def., to Sec'ys of the Military Dep'ts. (Apr. 20, 2012),
available at http://www.dod.gov/dodgc/images/withhold-authority.pdf (withholding
initial disposition authority from lower commanders in certain sexual assault
cases).
97. Sahil Kapur, McCaskill, Gillibrand Clash on How to Stop Rape in Military,
TALKING POINTS MEMO (Jul. 30, 2013, 10:00 AM),
http://talkingpointsmemo.com/dc/mccaskill-gillibrand-clash-on-how-to-stop-rape-in-
military ("[Senator Gillibrand's] competing plan would remove sexual
assault ... from the chain of command, over the objections of the defense
establishment.").
98. Id.
99. See Michael R. Crittenden, Military Sexual-Assault Rules Advance, WALL
ST. J. (Dec. 9, 2013, 8:12 PM),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303330204579248773997820
190.
100. Id. ("Opponents have argued that moving sexual assault cases out of the
chain of command is a bad idea because it would prevent unit commanders from
taking an active role in preventing and punishing sexual assaults.").
101. Kapur, supra note 97;see also Claire McCaskill, Sexual Assaults in the





that it might even be dangerous for a person to report an offense
without having the commander's support." Senator McCaskill
also points out that sometimes commanders bring charges when
prosecutors would not; she counts ninety-three such occasions in
the past two years, some of which resulted in conviction.03
At its root, Senator Gillibrand's approach does seek to
undermine the command structure, or at least its corrupting
influence over the administration of justice. While it may
augment cohesion to be vindicated by one's chain of command, this
vindication is often withheld entirely. Claiming that reporting
offenses may be dangerous without the support of one's
commandpr, moreover, misses the point: the commander who does
not support a legitimate report is unlikely to pursue court-martial
himself. And finally, appealing to ninety-three cases where
commanders brought charges when prosecutors would not is
unconvincing, as it ignores the more than 2500 reported sexual
assaults that were not brought to trial in 2012 alone.'" Vigorous
prosecution of sexual assault and rape cases is lacking throughout
the justice system, civil as well as military, but surely the proper
response is not to place the decision in the hands of an interested
party-instead, it is to ensure that there is a legitimate chance for
neutral prosecutors to enforce the law. Senator Gillibrand's
reforms bring this ideal closer to reality.
Senator Gillibrand's proposal is widely supported by many
women's groups, by Harry Reid, by Ted Cruz, and others."o' She
hoped to substitute her reforms for those of Senator McCaskill and
was promised a floor vote this spring. However, in March of 2014,
Senator McCaskill actually "led the charge" to block Senator
Gillibrand's bill from advancing in the Senate.'" Even though
many of Senator McCaskill's proposals have already been enacted
and represent a significant achievement, the more far-reaching
approach of Senator Gillibrand is needed in order to strengthen
the adversary process and promote just outcomes.
Even though the NDAA now provides a long-overdue right to
counsel in sexual assault cases, that right cannot be effective
102. Kapur, supra note 97.
103. McCaskill, supra note 101.
104. McCaskill, supra note 101; Bassett, supra note 96 ("The Pentagon estimates
that out of the 26,000 incidences of unwanted sexual contact that occurred in the
military in 2012, only 3,000 were reported, and only 300 led to prosecutions.").
105. Kapur, supra note 97.
106. Helene Cooper, Senate Rejects Blocking Military Commanders from Sex
Assault Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2014, at All.
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without a meaningful judicial process surrounding it. It is not
enough to receive legal consultation when a commanding officer
can quash or indefinitely delay any court-martial. Without a
legitimately functioning system of justice, the default power
dynamic in the military is maintained. Women, who remain the
numerical and cultural minority, will continue to be
disadvantaged until there is a neutral arbiter to moderate
disputes. Under the NDAA and Senator McCaskill's proposed
reforms, the status quo retains control over a choke point in
military justice. Only by disrupting command control can there be
a just and adversarial process made effective by the newly enacted
right to counsel for victims of sexual assault and rape. That is
why Senator Gillibrand's reforms remain necessary.
Conclusion
Gideon was a beginning in the quest for equal justice, and
even in the criminal context its full promise has not been achieved.
The four examples I have discussed demonstrate that the right to
appointed counsel needs to be extended beyond state felony
prosecutions to other situations as well. Otherwise, this nation
will fall far short in its aim of providing equal access to justice.
Providing counsel to indigents is costly, of course, and so is
providing an effective adversarial system. The accelerating
interest in law schools in pro bono work and the growth of a pro
bono bar of lawyers may help. But in our country, where we spend
so much and have so much, we can afford to provide some basic
protections for those in especially difficult situations, even though
they lack the funds to pay. The integrity of our processes demands
such reform, and so does justice to those who are caught up in
them.
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